Domain: Crypto Analytics, Blockchain Data, Community Management
Stage: Paid MVP
When: May 2022 – January 2023
Team Skill Set: One of us had a heavy development background, and the other came with sales, marketing and operations background, having previously served as a CFO.
Thesis
The idea started from the open nature of blockchain. Since all digital coin distributions are public, I thought it should be possible to observe which wallets hold which coins and detect patterns, like one person preferring type-A coins and another type-B. Our hypothesis was that wallet behavior could reveal user categories and that this data could be valuable for exchanges or crypto firms.
Our first mistake was classic: we started with a solution instead of a problem. We immediately ran toward a B2B model, planning to sell insights to big exchanges before even having a product, or knowing anyone in those companies. No one ever told us they needed or wanted what we were building. We assumed demand existed and spent about half a year developing under that assumption, producing almost no real learning.
Eventually, we realized our B2B approach wasn’t working and decided to pivot. This time, we focused on crypto communities, the people launching coin projects or minting NFTs (B2B2C approach). These project founders constantly struggled to understand who was in their community (who their holders were, what they cared about, and how they behaved across Discord or Telegram).
Our new product aimed to bridge community management and analytics, profiling coin holders and giving project launchers deeper insights about their members.
Validation
We suffered from a severe lack of early market research, which led to wasted time and effort. Once we pivoted, the new focus targeted the people launching coin projects or minting NFTs, and we went all in on outreach: talking to thousands of communities, and managed to secure a couple of paying clients, all based in Israel. The traction was encouraging but too local to prove scalability abroad. Our MVP aggregated wallet data, profiled coin holders, and tried to surface community insights. But because we never nailed one clear use case early, the product became too broad, a “jack of all trades, master of none.”
Most of the feedback we received from non-paying users revolved around competition and trust. The common question was: “How is this better than Collab.Land?” Once Collab.Land released its simple Discord integration, it dominated. Within months, it was adopted by 90% of the target communities. Competing with a trusted, established name became almost impossible at this stage.
Trust was another major challenge. The crypto world is a sensitive space, and since we were two unknown founders, communities viewed us with suspicion. Competitors like Collab.Land and Chainalysis already had credibility we couldn’t match.
When we tried to raise funding, investors gave a consistent answer: “Bring users.” The traction wasn’t convincing enough, and as the broader crypto market crashed, it became clear that it wasn’t the right time or place to keep pushing. Eventually, we decided to shut down.
Why it didn’t progress
- No Clear Payer: From the start, we didn’t focus enough on who would actually pay. Our B2B target was out of reach, and our pivot only generated minimal paying customers. Even after months of work, we lacked a sharp, validated value proposition.
- Competitive Lockout and Timing: Collab.Land’s timing was perfect. They solved one slice of our vision flawlessly and captured the market overnight. Once the market had chosen, technical differences didn’t matter.
- Trust Gap: Crypto is built on trust. As unknown founders, we couldn’t overcome the credibility barrier that established players already had. The fact that all our paying users were local Israelis proved we hadn’t figured out how to scale abroad.
- Funding Failure: Limited traction and a collapsing crypto market made fundraising impossible. Without users, investor confidence vanished.
Insights
- Talk to People First: Our biggest mistake was building before talking. We were “product and tech guys,” obsessed with execution instead of learning. The real information lives in conversations, not code.
- Find One Paying Customer Early: Before writing a single line of code, find one person who says, “If you build this, I’ll pay.” If that person doesn’t exist, the problem might not be real.
- Timing Beats Technology: I learned that timing kills more startups than bad tech. Once a trusted competitor wins the market, even superior technology can’t save you.
- Move Fast, but Listen: I don’t regret our pace, we moved quickly and learned a lot, but I’ve learned to channel that speed with more listening built in. Move fast, but in the right direction.
- Borrow Trust: In high-trust markets, unknown founders should partner with big players. Partnering with a known company like Binance could have given us instant credibility and access, for example.
- Be Realistic, Not Romantic: This experience made me far less romantic about ideas. Today, I only fall in love with an idea after seeing a paying customer.
